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Voting is one of the most important activities in a democratic society. In a traditional voting 
environment voting process sometimes becomes quite inconvenient due to the reluctance of 
certain voters to visit a polling booth to cast votes besides involving huge social and human 
resources. The development of computer networks and elaboration of cryptographic 
techniques facilitate the implementation of electronic voting. In this work we propose a 
secure electronic voting protocol that is suitable for large scale voting over the Internet. The 
protocol allows a voter to cast his or her ballot anonymously, by exchanging untraceable yet 
authentic messages. The e-voting protocol is based on blind signatures and has the properties 
of anonymity, mobility, efficiency, robustness, authentication, uniqueness, and universal 
verifiability and coercion-resistant. The proposed protocol encompasses three distinct phases 
- that of registration phase, voting phase and counting phase involving five parties, the voter, 














Election and voting are all now well known terms in modern days of Democracy. Stones and 
pot shards dropped in Greek vases led to paper ballots being dropped in sealed boxes. 
Nowadays, new technologies are developed to automate the voting process. The automation 
should preserve the security of the traditional elections (especially the privacy of the votes). 
Mechanical voting booths and punch cards have already been designed to replace paper 
ballots for faster counting. 
Electronic online voting over the Internet would be much more profitable. Many voters 
would appreciate the possibility of voting from anywhere. Convenience of the voting will 
result in increasing the number of participating voters. Fast, cheap and convenient voting 
process could have great impact on the contemporary democratic societies. Electronic voting, 
as the name implies, is the voting process held over electronic media, i.e. computers. For such 
a sensitive issue like election, security is one of the main concerns. But simplicity is also 
necessary to ensure the participation of common people. Besides security and simplicity, 
there may be some other issues that need to be considered. In that respect, we need to specify 
all such issues or properties that the election system must possess. A well-defined protocol is 
necessary to take care of all such requirements.  
Computers and facilitation of internet has spread its wings far and wide providing easy access 
everywhere. Thus in this context, holding election over the Internet seems logical from many 
different points of view. Relief from long queues, minimal chance of voting error, 
verifiability (not possible in case of face-to-face service) stands in favour of an electronic 
election. Recent improvements in network security have made it possible to design election 
system with high class security. But it is also important that carefully designed protocols and 
continuous improvements of the implementations are necessary to keep them out of reach 
from the network threats. From that point of view, an implementation of secure Internet 
voting protocol appears to be another application of cryptography and network security. 
Electronic voting has been intensively studied for over the last twenty years. Many e-voting 
protocols, therefore, have been proposed in the last several decades and both the security as 
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well as the effectiveness has been improved. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no 
practical and complete solution has been found for large scale elections over a network, say 
Internet. This paper suggests a practical application of the existing cryptographic schemes 
that ensures a fool-proof and verifiable protocol which can be implemented over the internet 
satisfying all e-voting security requirements.  
Design of secure e-voting protocols over a network is indeed a very difficult task as all the 
requirements of the voting system have to be met. Failure to ensure even one of the 
specifications can lead to chinks and glitches that can be exploited by a middleman to forge 
or manipulate the intricate details.  
The most efficient voting protocols could be categorized by the ir approaches into two major 
types: schemes using blind signatures and schemes using homomorphic encryption. The 
suitability of each of these types varies with the conditions under which it is to be applied.  
In the schemes using blind signatures, the voter obtains a token – a blindly signed message 
unknown to anyone except himself. Next, the voter sends his token together with his vote 
anonymously over a secure channel. These schemes require voter’s participation in more 
rounds. 
In the schemes using homomorphic encryption the voter cooperates with the authorities to 
construct an encryption of his vote. Due to the homomorphic property, an encryption of the 
sum of the votes is obtained by multiplying the encrypted votes of all voters. Subsequently, 
the result of the election is computed from the sum of the votes which is jointly decrypted by 
the authorities. 
A voting scheme must ensure that the voter can keep his vote private. In other words, the 
voter should not be able to prove to the third party that he has cast a particular vote. He must 
not be able to construct a proof of the content of his vote. This property is referred to as 
receipt-freeness. Only a few schemes guaranteeing receipt- freeness have been proposed. 
Among these schemes, receipt-free scheme using blind signatures assumes the existence of a 
special anonymous untappable channel. Achieving the communication that is both secure and 






1.2 Motivation and Objective 
This project work is motivated by the fact that there needs to be an assurance of certain 
important issues that govern the basic principles of a secure voting protocol and the need to 
implement one based on existing cryptographic schemes for voting. Tradit ional techniques 
implemented for election and voting often suffered from drawbacks ranging from coercivity 
to anonymity. The basic idea of employing the blind signature schemes using a randomizing 
factor at each stage is to ensure that the manipulation of the vote is avoided, while blinding 
the vote and passing it over a secure channel and at the same time receiving the digital 
signatures from an authentication centre which vouches for the integrity of the votes and final 
unblinding the votes and tallying the results. Our implementation involves basically the 
aforesaid steps. An empirical study of the various existing protocols revealed the pros and 















2.1 Traditional Elections 
The electronic voting system over the internet must emulate certain features of traditional 
voting schemes. We briefly sketch the most important ones of them.  
Voting committee takes care of voters: It allows only eligible voters to vote, and ensures that 
every voter votes only once. After the elections, voting committee counts the votes and 
publishes the result. The ballots remain a secret, that is, a person’s way of voting cannot be 
comprehended by a third party, the scheme just specifies that the person has voted and his 
name in the existing list of the voters is marked. Even if the voter tells his vote to another 
voter or a third party, he/she will not believe him – he can easily lie. On the other hand, the 
voter cannot be absolutely sure that his vote was really counted. He can just believe it was. 




2.2 The Basic Model 
In the proposed model laid out for implementation, the parties involved are the voters, the 
authentication server, the certification server, the counting server and the voting server. The 
voter can be viewed as a client who connects to the server as a single thread; his casting of 
vote implicitly calculates the ballot value. The servers can be seen as authorities involved in a 




2.2.1 The Voter 
In general, voters are not willing to comply with complicated and time spending voting 
process. Therefore voter’s actions and computations during the electronic voting should be 
kept at minimum, realizing vote-and-go concept. Voter can abstain from voting if he wishes 
to – he need not participate in the voting, or he can stop his voting any time before it is 




2.2.2 The Authorities 
The authorities are the participating parties who manage the complete voting scheme.  They 
have large computing power and they can store large amount of data in secret. It is assumed 
in the given scenario that the participating authorities perform the assigned work and neither 
of the authorities can be disruptive or revealing. Furthermore, they are expected to authorize 
the votes and provide a reliable scheme as a whole.  
 
2.2.3 The Vote 
The structure of the vote largely depends on the type of election system being followed, i.e., 
the mode of selection of candidates in the vote  
The various voting schemes[14] are elucidated as follows:- 
 One choice yes/no format – in this format the voter’s choice is either a yes or no. Vote 
is generally one bit – 1 for yes and 0 for no. 
 Single choice from n possibilities – This format has “n” choices of which the voter is 
expected to choose only one. 
 K out of L voting – this formant has the voter selecting K choices out of L given 
choices. Vote here is a K-tuple (v1 · · · vK). 
 K out of L ordered voting – in this format the voter selects K choices and orders them 
unlike the previous case which only included random choicing. Vote here is an 
ordered K-tuple (v1 · · · vK). 
 Structured voting – In this format there are n levels of possibilities. Voter moves from 
the first level to the last one. At the ith level he can select at most ki  possibilities from 
the subset Si of all possibilities in the ith level. 
 Write- in format – In this format the voter casts his own vote by writing his own 
answer wherein the vote is generally a string of specified length.  
In addition to the voting formats discussed above there may be categorization on the basis 
of equality of votes. It can be equal-voting where the vote of the user is counted at most 
once else it can be calculated with a given weight w. This weight w is determined as a 
result of the priority and privilege of the voters participating. A structure containing the 
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vote is called a ballot. It can be easy, difficult or impossible to extract the vote from the 
ballot, depending on the scheme. 
 
 
2.2.4 Communication Channel 
Based on the type of communication being followed , the channels that define the method of 
communication between the voters and the authorities, that is the way the vote is channelized 
from the voter to the server, can be of three major categories- untappable channel , 
anonymous untraceable channel , untappable anonymous channel.  
The channels must be fully secure and provide for efficient data communication minimizing 
network congestion and avoiding jitters if any.  
 
 
2.3 Electronic Voting Scheme 
Both the authorities and the voters have to follow electronic voting schemes which prescribe 
the voter’s and the authorities’ actions and computations during the period of voting.  The 
voting is done with the voter as a client in the voting server, the vote of the user ge nerating a 
message that is encrypted with a suitable key and sent across to the servers asking for 
signatures and certification. Finally the valid votes are updated into the database in the 
counting server and the results are determined. This section envisages the different phases in 
the voting system and the various trust requirements the protocol aims to fulfill. 
 
 
2.3.1 The Phases of the e-voting scheme 
The entire voting scheme is divided into a number of phases to simplify the actions and the 
procedures to be followed by clearly identifying the steps to be followed in each phase  
 Registration or Initialization Phase  - In this phase the voter registers himself with 
the system. Each registered user receives a unique user_id and a password assigned to 
him that uniquely identifies the voter, thereby preserving the identity of the voter. The 
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authorities setup the system, generate their public and secret keys and publish the 
public values. 
 Voting Phase – In this phase the voters cast their votes. The voter communicates with 
authorities through the channels he can use, forming a ballot containing his vote. 
Finally he sends his ballot to its destination.  
 Counting Phase - Authorities use their public and secret information to open the 
ballots and count the votes. They publish the result of elections. 
 
 
2.3.2 The Security Requirements of an Efficient 
e-voting System 
 
For the e-voting system to function properly that ensures error- free and robust electronic 
voting over the internet, it must satisfy the following criteria.[11] 
 Eligibility - Only eligible voters can vote and no one votes twice 
 Anonymity - Any traceability between the voter and his vote must be              
removed. 
 Verifiability - A voter is able to verify that his or her vote is counted in the final tally. 
So also a passive observer can check that the election is fair: the published final tally 
is really the sum of the votes 
 Fairness - No one should be able to compute a partial tally as the election progresses 
 Coercibility - No one can use force or compel anybody to vote 
 Receipt-freeness - A voter cannot prove that he or she voted in a certain way.  
 Privacy - No coalition of participants (of reasonable composition) not containing 
voter himself can gain any information about the voter’s vote. By reasonable 
composition we mean coalition of at most t authorities and any number of voters.  
 Robustness - Faulty behavior of any reasonably sized coalition of participants can be 





2.4 Cryptographic Building Blocks 
In this section we lay down some of the known Cryptographic concepts that are vital for the 
functioning of the electronic voting system. 
 
 
2.4.1 A List of Notations used  
V1, V2 , . . . .,VM         M voters 
v1, v2, . . . , vM            votes of the voters 
Zp                               field of positive integers modulo p, where p is prime number 
Zn                               set of integers modulo n, i.e. {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}  
Zn*                             set of integers from Zn relatively prime to n 
Gcd (a, b)                   greatest common divisor of the integers a, b  
a ⨁ b      bitwise exclusive or 
 
 
2.4.2 Bit-Commitment Scheme 
The bit-commitment scheme involves two parties – a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob).  
Suppose that Alice wants to send a message “m” in “b” bits to Bob and doesn’t want to reveal 
“b” to Bob immediately. As per Bob, Alice should not be allowed to change her mind in the 
meantime and the bit she later reveals will be the same as she thinks of now. Alice encrypts 
the bit “b” and sends the encrypted bit to Bob. Bob, however, is not able to recover b until 
Alice sends him the key. Encryption of b is called a blob.  
The bit commitment scheme is a function ξ: {0, 1} ×X → Y,[14] 
where X, Y are finite sets. An encryption of b is any value ξ (b, k), k Є X. 
PROPERTIES -  
 Concealing – Bob cannot determine the value from the encrypted blob.  
 Binding – Alice can then reveal the b,k used to construct the encrypted bit and open 
the blob 
Hence, if Alice wants to commit to a string of bits, she commits each bit independently.  
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Now consider a variant of the bit commitment scheme, which we call trapdoor bit 
commitment[7]. Alice wants to commit two bits with Bob. Later, she wants to reveal only 
one of the committed bits to Bob. To implement this[], Alice sends [{b}k, {b0}k0 ] to Bob. If 
she wishes to reveal b, she sends ({b0}k0 , inv(k)) to Bob. If she wishes to reveal b0, she sends 
({b}k, inv(k0)). It is easy to show that exactly one of the bits is revealed to Bob. 
 
 
2.4.3 RSA Cryptosystem 
The RSA Cryptosystem[2] consists of mainly the following phases:- 
1. Key Generation – The sender Alice creates her public key and a corresponding 
private key and then follows the following steps :-  
 Generate two large random distinct primes p, q  
 Compute n = pq, n′ = (p − 1)(q − 1) 
 Select an integer e, 1 < e < n′ such that gcd(e, n′) = 1  
 Find an integer d, 1 < d < n′ such that ed ≡ 1 mod n′ 
 Thus, the public key is (n, e), the private key is d.  
2. Encryption - To encrypt an integer m, 0 ≤ m < n, Bob, the receiver, should compute c 
= me mod n. 
3. Decryption - Alice now computes the plaintext m from the cipher text c as   
 m = cd mod n. 
 
 
2.4.4 Digital Signatures  
 
Digital Signatures, in the field of Cryptography and Network Security are generally, in 
layman terms, the computational analog of written signatures. That is, some object that has 
been attached or so to say attested to another, which may be a simple message that has to be 
transferred over a network between two parties or a file that needs a certification of va lidity, 
undeniably associating it with the signer. The signature must have three properties.  
 20 
 
First, it must be unique; the signatures of different parties must be different. Second, the 
signature must not be forgeable; Alice cannot create Bob’s signature. Third, the digital 
signature needs to be verifiable; so anyone can confirm the authenticity.  
We demonstrate the concept of digital signatures with a simple example. Suppose Alice 
wishes to sign a message m, which is ordinarily a hexadecimal string, with public key e, 
private key d, and public modulus of N, she can do it so by encrypting with her private key 
and generating the signature as 
       S = md (mod N) 
Thereafter, any passive verifier, say Victor, can check that S is indeed Alice’s signature by 
decrypting with her public key 
                 m = Se (mod N) = (md)e (mod N) = mde (mod N) = m (mod N) 
 
 
2.4.5 One way Hash Function 
A one-way hash is a mathematical function. We say h is the hash of M for hashing function H  
     h = H (M). 
The electronic equivalent of the document and fingerprint pair is the message and digests 
pair. To preserve the integrity of a message, the message is passed through an algorithm 
called cryptographic hash function .The function creates a compressed image of the 
message that can be used like a fingerprint. To check the integrity of the message, we again 
run the cryptographic hash function and compare the new message digest with the previous 





Fig 2.1  A general cryptographic hash function 
 
A one way hash should conform to the following properties[10]:- 
 Preimage Resistance – This property concurs that given a hash function H and h = H 
(M), it should be extremely difficult for any middleman Oscar to find any message M′ 
such that h = H (M′).  
 Second preimage Resistance – This property concurs that a message cannot be easily 
forged. Given a specific message and its digest, it is computationally impossible to 
create another message with the same digest.  
 Collision Resistance – This criterion ensures that Oscar cannot find two messages that 
hash to the same digest. Mathematically,  
            it is hard to find two messages m, m′ such that H(m) = H(m′).  
A number of hashing algorithms have been proposed in the past, each of which tries 
to fulfill the aforesaid properties. The most popular and widely used hashing 
algorithms are enlisted as follows:-  
Message Digest – In regard to message digest or MD, several hashing algorithms 
were proposed by Ronald Rivest[2], namely MD2, MD4, MD5.The MD5 algorithm 
breaks the message into blocks of 512 bits creating a 128-bit digest. However, MD5 
has been broken; an attack against it was used to break SSL in 2008[10]. 
SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm)[10] – This is a standard developed by the NSA and 
published as a Federal Information Processing standard (FIP 180). It is mostly based 
on the MD5 algorithm. The SHA consists of different versions like the SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Considering the SHA-512, the newest 
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version of SHA algorithms, it creates a digest of 512 bits from a multiple block 
message. Each block is a1024 bits in length. The digest is initialized to a 
predetermined value of 512 bits. The algorithm mixes this initial value with the first 
block of message to create the first intermediate message digest of 512 bits. It is the 
iteratively mixed with the second block to create the second intermediate digest. 
Finally the (N-1)th digest is mixed with the Nth block to create the Nth digest. After 
the processing of the last block, the resulting digest is the message digest for the entire 
message. SHA-512 presumes that length of original message is less than 2128 bits and 
creates a 512-bit message digest for the given message. 
Apart from these two, other popular hashing algorithms are RIPEMD-128 and 
RIPEMD-160, GOST, Whirlpool, etc. 
 
 
2.4.6 Blind Signatures and Blinding 
In cryptography, a blind signature, as introduced by David Chaum [1], is a form of digital 
signature in which the content of a message is disguised (blinded) before it is signed. The 
resulting blind signature can be publicly verified against the original, unblinded message in 
the manner of a regular digital signature.  
Blind signatures can be used to provide unlinkability, which prevents the signer from linking 
the blinded message it signs to a later un-blinded version that it may be called upon to verify. 
In this case, the signer's response is first "un-blinded" prior to verification in such a way that 
the signature remains valid for the un-blinded message. This can be useful in schemes where 
anonymity is required. 
This property of blind signatures is exploited to be used in case of e-voting system where 
anonymity is a major concern. 
 
There are three parties in the scheme. 
– Bob is the signer who has agreed to sign documents blindly.  
– Alice is the holder of the message he wants Bob to sign.  
– Victor is our verifier who checks whether the signature is Bob’s.  
There are five phases defined in the scheme. 
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 Key Generation – Bob sets up the signature by generating all public and secret 
elements. Public elements are published via a trusted authority while secret elements 
are kept private. 
 Blinding – Alice chooses a random elements and masks his message and send the  
blind message to Bob. 
 Signing – Bob takes the blind message and signs it. The signature is sent to Alice. 
 Unblinding – Alice takes the signed blind message, removes the mask (random 
element) and creates a valid signature for the message.  
 Verification – everybody who knows the public key, the message and its signature 
can verify if they match. 
If the signer has RSA public key (n, e) and the corresponding private key d, he can sign a 
message m, m Є Zn as s = m
d mod N. Given the signature s of the message m, anyone can 
verify its validity by checking whether m = se mod N. 
The blind version uses a random value r, such that r is relatively prime to N (i.e. gcd(r, N) = 
1). r is raised to the public exponent e modulo N, and the resulting value remod N is used as a 
blinding factor. The author of the message computes the product of the message and blinding 
factor, i.e.   
m′ = mre(mod N) 
It then sends the resulting value m' to the signing authority. Because r is a random value and 
the mapping r→re(mod N) is a permutation it follows that remod N is random too. This 
implies that m' does not leak any information about m. The signing authority then calculates 
the blinded signature s' as: 
s′ = (m′)d mod N 
s' is sent back to the author of the message, who can then remove the blinding factor to reveal 
s, the valid RSA signature of m : 
s = s′.r-1 (mod N) 
This works because RSA keys satisfy the equation red=r  (mod N) and thus 
s = s′.r-1 = (m′)d r-1 = md red r-1 = md r r-1 = md (mod N)  





2.5 Various Approaches  
This section gives a brief introduction to the approaches used in various voting schemes. 
While they do not accurately give a picture of the exact procedures followed, the approaches 
can be seen as the basic framework of different voting schemes  
For any voting scheme, privacy seems to be the most important issue. Up to now, only a few 
approaches to achieve privacy have been invented. Privacy means that the link between the 
voter and his vote is disposed or inaccessible to everyone (including authority), even if all of 
the public communication is monitored. 
Privacy can be accomplished in the following ways:-  
 It is easy to view the vote, but impossible to trace it back to the voter.  
 Simultaneous determination of the voter and the vote is impossible.  
 While it may be difficult to see the vote, identity of the voter is traceable.  
From the above, the first and second approaches have to use untraceable anonymous channel 
for casting the votes.  
 
2.5.1 Schemes Based on Blind Signatures 
Blind signature schemes exist for many public key signing protocols. The message to be 
signed is designated the value m, which is considered to be some legitimate input to the 
signature function. As an analogy[9], consider that Alice has a letter which should be signed 
by an authority (say Bob), but Alice does not want to reveal the content of the letter to Bob. 
She can place the letter in an envelope lined with carbon paper and send it to Bob. Bob will 
sign the outside of the carbon envelope without opening it and then send it back to Alice. 
Alice can then open it to find the letter signed by Bob, but without Bob having seen its 
contents. 
More formally a blind signature scheme is a cryptographic protocol that involves two parties,  
a user Alice that wants to obtain signatures on her messages, and a signer Bob that is in 
possession of his secret signing key. At the end of the protocol Alice obtains a signature on m 




    
 
Fig 2.2    Application of Blind Signatures to voting 
In the voting phase, the voter sends a ballot containing the token, which basically consists of 
some data like the voter id, random numbers and his vote through the anonymous channel to 
the authority. The authority will not accept the ballot with invalid token or with the token that 
has already been used. This ensures that only eligible voters can vote and that they can vote at 
most once. As no one can make any connection between the voter and the token or trace the 
casted ballot back to the voter, no one can deduce anything about how the voter voted. 
Hence, the privacy is achieved. 
A number of protocols exist on the basis of blind signature schemes and a few of them are 
discussed in the sections to follow. 
 
 
2.5.2 Schemes Based on Homomorphic 
Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption[16] is a form of encryption where a specific algebraic operation 
is performed on the plaintext and a possibly different algebraic operation is performed on the 
ciphertext. The major drawback of these schemes is that they do not support write- in votes. 
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On the other hand, these schemes perform considerably faster than other types, mostly due to 
the speed in the tallying phase. 
The principal guiding factor in this scheme is the homomorphic property:-  
E(m1) + E(m2) = E(m1 + m2) 
where E represents the encryption done on messages m1 and m2. The E(m1) + E(m2) is a 
calculation in a group G, whereas E(m1 + m2) is a calculation in a group H. The `+' is a group 
operator corresponding to each group, and may be different for G and H. 
Advantage of the homomorphic property is the votes can be counted and verified without 
knowledge of the individual votes. After the election, the encrypted votes are combined into a 
single, encrypted, quantity. The authorities then decrypt this tally, in the group H. Due to the 
homomorphic property, this quantity should equal the quantity resulting from the decryption 
of each of the individual votes in group G. In this way, tallying is done without learning the 





















In spite of the presence of numerous cryptographic techniques and schemes, a completely 
practical or theoretical solution for internet voting has never been laid down. A number of 
practical voting schemes have been proposed, with widely differing security properties. In the 
sections to follow, we investigate the working of a few protocols which are popularly 
followed as a base, the schemes introducing new ideas and the schemes efficient in practice.  
Initially protocols basing on anonymous channels were proposed for casting the ballots. 
Later, the schemes exploiting homomorphic encryption were introduced. The property of 
receipt-freeness was introduced to be satisfied, so schemes were devised that assured of 
receipt-freeness. Schemes that use blind signatures are quite popular simply because the fact 
that they are highly efficient and care conducive for any kind of voting scheme. Sc hemes 
using blind signatures suffer from the lack of universal verifiability in most cases. This is 
overcome by the schemes using homomorphic encryption but the computation and 
communication complexity becomes a serious overhead. As also, they cannot be used for any 
kind of voting unlike the blind signatures schemes.  
 
 
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption 
Models 
A number of protocols have been proposed which conform to methods of homomorphic 
encryption. The first scheme using homomorphic encryption had been proposed by Benaloh 
and Yung[18]. Further modification to this model was carried out by Sako and Kilian[19] to 
improve communication efficiency. Thereafter the model proposed by Cramer, Gennaro and 
Schoenmakers[8] which was a relatively simple and efficient scheme.  Benaloh and 
Tuinstra[17] introduced concept of receipt freeness which was later disproved.  
In this model, the voter sends his encrypted vote through a public channel. The vote can be 
decrypted by any set of at least “t + 1” authorities, and any set of the  “t” authorities cannot 
decrypt the encrypted vote. 




• A key to decrypt the vote is shared between any set of “t + 1” authorities which is known as 
threshold public-key cryptosystem, as in ElGamal cryptosystem.  
 
• Each authority has its own instance of the cryptosystem. The voter shares his encrypted vote 
among the N authorities using (t+1, N) secret sharing scheme .The voter sends to the each 
authority its encrypted share.  
This will prevent malicious authorities to abuse their role and to violate voter’s privacy.  
Encryption method used for encrypting votes is homomorphic, i.e.  Multiplication 
of the encrypted votes v1,v2: E(v1) ⊗E(v2) is an encrypted sum of the votes E(v1⊕ v2). 
 
In a yes/no voting, votes are represented by +1 for yes and -1 for no. Let be p and q be large 
primes such that q is a factor of p-1 and let g Є Zp be an element of order q. The secret 
encryption key is x Є Zq and the public encryption key is 
 y = g^x mod p, and w=y^k  g^v  modp , 
where k is a random number in Zp .(Z,p) is decrypted by taking w/Z^x modp and by 
comparing the result with g modp and g^-1 modp .Each voter encrypts his/her vote with the 
public encryption key of a voting authority and then publishes the encryption on a bullet in 
board, together with a proof of correctness: that the encryption contains a valid vote  
At the end of the voting period the authorities “multiply” all the received encryptions to get 
an encryption of the tally. The authorities then jointly decrypt this. The final tally can be 
checked for accuracy by all parties. So we are assured of universal verifiability. For 
robustness the encryption procedure is distributed among n authorities using threshold 
cryptography. 
An election system based on the Cramer et al scheme [8] has been implemented and piloted 
on a limited basis. A drawback of such schemes is their reduced flexibility, as the votes are 
essentially limited to yes/no value. In addition, the Cramer et al scheme which uses ElGamal 
encryption has a relatively high computational complexity, if the number of candidates is 
large. 
Alternative homomorphic encryption voting schemes have been proposed for which the 




3.1.1 Cramer et al Protocol 
Cramer et al protocol[8] has the voter sharing his vote among the authorities using secret 
sharing scheme. This protocol uses the ElGamal cryptosystem.  
A simple yes-no protocol proposed by Cramer is suggested here[14]. 
In the initialization stage, the authorities share the decryption key s. Public key    (p, g, h), 
commitments of the shares hj = gsj and a fixed generator G of Gq are published. 
In the voting stage, the voter Vi chooses his vote: m0 = G for yes-vote, m1 = 1/G for no-vote. 
The encrypted vote is of the form (x, y) = (gk, hkmb), where k is random and b Є {0, 1}. 
Voter adds a proof that his vote is of the correct form.For this, a non- interactive proof that 
logg x = logh(y/G) V logg x = logh(yG) is used. The encrypted vote along with the proof of 
validity is sent across to bulletin board.  
In the counting phase, the validity proofs are checked and the product of all valid encrypted 
votes is calculated. The authorities jointly execute the decryption protocol to obtain the value 
of W = Y/Xs  . We get W, as per the equation,     
         W = GT , where T is the difference between the yes and no votes.  
This protocol can be extended for a single choice out of many options voting scheme.  
Characteristics of the Scheme  – 
 Privacy - Privacy of the votes is guaranteed partly by the security of ElGamal 
cryptosystem. Individual vote is hidden for any set of at most t authorities.  
 Verifiability - Any passive observer can check the proofs of validity of the ballots, 
and make a product of the valid votes or check the accuracy of the decryption by 
checking the proofs of authorities of using correct shares.  
 Receipt-Freeness - Voter can reveal to any third party how he has voted by showing 
randomness k used in the ElGamal encryption. Therefore, this scheme is not receipt-
free and prone to coercion.  
 Eligibility - Erroneous ballots of forged voters will not pass through the proof of 




3.2 Schemes based on mixed-nets 
The initial schemes based on mixed nets were devised by David Chaum[15]. 
The mix-net model is composed of several linked servers where each server accepts a batch 
of encrypted votes randomizes it and then outputs a batch of permuted votes such that the 
input is unlinkable with the output vote.  
First the authority takes the batch of encrypted votes, permutes it in a random order, and then 
re-encrypts each encrypted vote. The permutation is known only to the voter.  
The permutated batch of re-encrypted votes is published and handed to the next authority; 




Fig 3.1 A general Mix-net model 
The next authority shuffles the votes in the same way as the first autho rity shuffled the 
original batch: it permutes the batch in a random order, re-encrypts each vote, and unveils the 
permutation to the voter publishes the produced batch of votes.  
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This process is repeated for several times, in the final stage the last author ity performs the 
same process and publishes the final list of permuted and re-encrypted votes. 
Therefore, only he knows the voter can map his vote in the final list of the permuted votes.  
In large-scale elections, this model of mixed nets is useful because of their universal 
verifiability, anonymity property.  
3.3 Blind Signature Schemes 
Our implementation mainly focuses on exploiting the security of schemes based on blind 
signatures. All schemes on blind signatures follow a basic set of framework: The voter first 
votes and sends a token along with his encrypted vote. The token can be anything like a valid 
issued ID signed by the authority as authentic single time only. Then it is blinded and the 
authority finally unblinds the signature and the counter centre maintains the result. 
We move further by examining certain protocols that have been suggested in this area that 
create a base for the implementation of the internet voting scheme.  
 
3.3.1 The FOO Protocol 
The FOO Protocol, as it is popularly known, is an acronym for Fujioka - Okamoto-Ohta 
Protocol[1]. It was the first protocol to ensure both the privacy and the fairness feature that is 
so vital to internet voting. The scheme consists of voters, administrator and a counter server 
with an assumption that communication is done over an anonymous channel. It also requires 
a bit commitment scheme, a digital signature scheme and a blind signature scheme.  
Fujioka, et al. requires the voter to perform three steps.  
1. Request the administrator to sign the vote and send it to the counter. 
2. Check that the vote is listed by the counter, confirm any of signatures listed, and, if 
everything is okay, send the keys to uncommit.  
3. Confirm that all votes were uncommitted and counted correctly.  
We now outline the steps in the FOO protocol as suggested by Fujioka et al.  
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Initialization phase- The voter selects the vote vi and completes the ballot ξ (vi,ki) using a 
randomly generated key ki. Then it encrypts the ballot with an encryption function to generate 
ei=χ (xi,ri). Vi the voter signs si=σ (ei) to ei and sends <IDi,ei,si> to the administrator. 
Administration phase – The admin checks if the voter is valid, or he has right to vote, if not, 
his candidature is rejected. So also, an already registered user cannot register aga in. If the 
signature si received on the message ei is valid, the admin signs di =σA (ei) and sends di as 
admin A’s signature to Vi. At the end of this stage, the admin announces the valid list of Vi 
publishing a list containing <IDi,ei,si>. 
Voting Phase – The voter realizes the signature of the ballot xi as yi = σ (di,ri) and checks that 
yi is the admin’s signature .Vi sends <xi,yi> to the counter. 
Collection phase – The counter checks the signature yi of the ballot xi using the verification 
key. If checks returns true, the ballot is updated to a list where the votes are counted and 
result declared. 
In these, the implicit assumption is that the channel used is anonymous and the three parties 
do not collude with each other.  
IMPORTANT PROPERTIES ADDRESSED –  
1. Security – Because they are randomly generated and used for a single communication 
between two parties, no session key is intentionally used more than once by party 
involved. 
2. Privacy – Privacy is maintained by phasing the process and the parties involved, only 
way of breaking it would be if one of the parties colludes with the other, which 
according to the assumption is not possible.  
3. Unreusability – No voter can vote twice as has been demonstrated in the 
administration phase. 
4. Eligibility – Unregistered voters cannot vote since voting is open only to registered 
voters and breaking the blind signature scheme is difficult.  
5. Fairness – Counting of the ballot doesn’t affect the voting process since that stage 





3.3.2 Randomization enhanced Chaum’s 
scheme 
David Chaum was a pioneer in the digital signature based voting scheme. The first proposed 
Chaum’s blind signature scheme[5] somewhat followed the FOO protocol but was a 
significant improvement over it. But later Coron-Naccache-Stern[6] proposed a signature 
forgery strategy of the RSA digital signature scheme. The attack is valid on Chaum’s blind  
signature scheme. So instead of following the original blind signature scheme, our 
implementation follows a method to inject a randomizing factor into a message when it is 
signed by the signer in Chaum’s blind signature scheme[4] such that attackers cannot obtain 
the signer’s signatures of the special form for the attack.  Users cannot eliminate these 
randomizing factors embedded in the signatures obtained from the signer.  
The phases and the inherent steps followed in the scheme are described as follows:-  
Registration phase: 
1. Each voter Vi  (V1 ..... Vn ) willing to vote must register himself at certification centre, 
which provides a unique voter IDi  along with a voting ticket to each legitimate voter 
Vi   . 
2. The Authentication center publishes its public data e ,n and a one way hash function 
such as SHA-1 or MD5. 
3. Blinding:  Each voter Vi  randomly chooses an integer ri Є Zn*, which is the set of all 
positive integers less than and relatively prime to n. And also chooses a positive 
integer ui less than n. Then it computes      
                                   α = ri
e   H(mi )(ui
2  + 1)mod n. 
And then sends α to the Authentication Center. After receiving α, the Authentication Center 
randomly selects a positive integer xi, the voter Vi chooses an integer bi   Є Zn* and computes 
                                   β = bi
e (ui  - xi) mod n.  
Finally the voter Vi submits (β , IDi ) to the Authentication Center.  
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       4.   Signing: this process is done by the authentication center. After receiving β  , it 
computes ti = (α (xi
2 + 1) β-2)d mod n. The integer xi is called the randomization factor. Then 
it sends ti   to the voter Vi. 
        5.    Unblinding: this process is done by each legitimate voter Vi. After receiving ti , the 
voter Vi computes 
                                    Ci = (ui xi + 1) (ui – xi ) 
– 1 mod n 
                                     Si = ri
 – 1 bi
2 ti mod n 
               Si is the signature of the authentication center on message mi. To verify the 
authenticity of the signature, he/she examines if the following equation holds good 
                                     Si = H (mi) (C i
2 + 1) mod n. 
                 When the deadline of registration is over, the authentication center displays (IDi , 
Si , Ci)in to a list. It publishes the list after the election date 
Voting phase: 
1. Each voter Vi retrieves the signature of the authentication center and checks its 
validity. It checks that the voter has not previously casted any vote. Then he sends 
(IDi , Si , Ci) to the Counting center. 
2. The Counting center verifies the signature of the ballot. If verified, it puts (IDi , Si , 
Ci) in to the list . It publishes the list after the election date.  
Counting phase : 
1. Each voter Vi verifies whether Si , Ci are in the list. If not, then he  can complain by 
showing the valid pair.  
2. After the deadline of confirmation is over, counting is done. Then it publishes the 
final result of election. 
 
 












3.1 Comparison of the various 
protocols studied 
The Fujioka et. al. protocol is considered to be one of the most suitable and promising for 
large-scale elections, since the communication and computation overhead is fairly small even 
if the number of voters is large. Moreover, this type of scheme naturally can allow multiple 
values voting, and is also very compatible with the framework of existing physical voting 
systems. 
Given below is a comparison of various protocols[12] and the properties they satisfy and why 
a randomized enhanced Chaum’s blind signature model based on the FOO protocol has been 
chosen as the implementation scheme. Evaluating the three different protocols on their 
feasibility is debatable since requirements of each have to be met. Besides, there have already 
been mentioned a number of actual implementations based on these protocols that meet some 
requirements and are practical for large-scale elections. Nevertheless, some of the 
prerequisites defined in the theoretical analysis of these protoco ls can be unrealistic to 
achieve in practice. 
Properties Fujioka et. al. 
(based on blind 
signature) 
Cramer et. al. 
(based on homomorphic 
cryptosystem) 
Chaum 
(based on mix-net) 
Privacy yes yes yes 
Verifiability yes yes Depends on mix net 
Availability no yes no 
Integrity yes yes yes 
Reliability yes yes Depends on mix net 
Incoercibility no no no 
 
                Table showing the comparison of various types of voting protocols  
Evaluating the three different protocols on their feasibility is debatable since requirements of 
each have to be met. Besides, there have already been mentioned a number of actual 
implementations based on these protocols that meet some requirements and are practical for 
large-scale elections. Nevertheless, some of the prerequisites defined in the theoretical 
analysis of these protocols can be unrealistic to achieve in practice.  
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Besides, when comparing the efficiency of voting schemes, one needs to refer to some 
“reasonable” parameter values. The most important parameters are the number of voters N 
and the number of options of multiple option question L. Other parameters are the number of 
authorities M and the trust threshold t. So the suitability and usability of each protocol varies 























4.1 Required Components 
For the implementation of the Secure Internet Voting Protocol, we have chosen JAVA as our 
base language.  
We have used J2SE JDK and NetBeans IDE 6.7  
The required database, i.e, the Candidate’s database, the eligible Voter’s database and the 
result database were created and maintained by using Java Derby. Derby is based on the Java, 
JDBC, and SQL standards. 
Cryptography in java requires The JavaTM Cryptography Extension (JCE). JCE provides a 
framework and implementations for encryption, key generation, key agreement, Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms, etc. It supports symmetric, asymmetric, block, and 
stream ciphers encryption techniques. 
The JCE API covers RSA (Asymmetric encryption) which is used for public key 
management in the voting protocol. An implementation of the MD5 and SHA1, SHA-256, 
SHA-512 keyed-hashing algorithms is also covered in the JCE API which is used in the 
protocol. This framework includes everything in the javax.crypto package.  
Additionally, different packages or jar files were also used in the implementation of the 
protocol. By using Java Derby as the database management system, we used derb y.jar file 
and in addition to it for the implementation of decryption we have used the freely available 
gnu.crypto jar file. 
 
 
4.2 Implementation Steps 
Architecture: 
The architecture of our system mainly consists of multiple voters, a authenticator server and a 
counting server. The voter blinds his vote and sends it to the authentication server which is 
then signed by the authenticator’s signature and sent to the voter. The voter sends his signed 
vote to the counting server through anonymous channel. Java provides basic networking 
functionality used to connect the voter with the servers. This includes the ability to create 
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sockets and send object streams through them. Objects are also serializable, that is, 
















First step in the voting system is registration where the voter has to go to a registration office 
and show his voters ID card and if he is eligible to vote he can register for voting. He has to 
remember his user name and the password he has used while registration to vote successfully. 
After the user has registered successfully he is given a randomly generated number which is 
his ID number and should be noted down and kept secret for the voting process. A voter table 
is created in this stage where the voter’s username, ID, password and his voting status 
(whether he has voted? Initially marked with 0 for false) are stored.  
 
Login Phase: 
When the date for voting arrives the voter can login using his username, password and the 
unique ID number given to him the registration phase.  
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The voter’s input is verified in the registration file if it is correct and the voter has not voted 
yet then he is redirected to the voting page. The voting page displays the candidates’ names. 
Each candidate has his candidate ID which is kept secret and known only to the authenticator.  
As according to the set of guidelines laid down before the implementation, the protocol 
satisfies different properties. A voter cannot vote twice. Once he has logged in , his unique ID 




When the voter has successfully logged in he is connected to the authentication server. The 
server runs a number of threads for multiple connections, which will respond to secure 
connection request from a voter. The voter selects a vote vi and bit commit the vote with a 
randomly selected key ki which is a 512 bit key generated by SecureRandom method.  
Then the voter sends the bit committed vote to the server. The server generates SHA-512 
hash of the bit committed vote using the java.security.MessageDigest 
Package.  
MessageDigest md=MessageDigest.getInstance(“SHA-512”) 
The next step is blinding, in this step each voter Vi  randomly chooses an integer ri Є Zn*, 
which is the set of all positive integers less than and relatively prime to n. And also chooses a 
positive integer ui less than n. Then it computes          
 α = ri
e   H (mi) (ui
2 + 1) mod n. 
Then sends α to the Authentication server.  The Authentication server randomly selects a 
positive integer xi , the voter Vi chooses an integer b Є Zn* and computes 
        β= bi
e (ui  - xi) mod n.  
Finally the voter Vi submits (β , IDi ) to the Authentication Center.  
The next stage in this process is signing; this process is done by the authentication server. 
After receiving β, it computes 
 ti = (αi (xi
2 + 1) βi









2 + 1)mod n
xi
Βi = bi
e (ui - xi) mod n
ti
 
Fig 4.2 Interaction between the voter and authenticator 
 
The integer xi is called randomization factor. Then it sends ti  to the voter Vi. 
After receiving ti , the voter Vi computes 
     Ci = (ui xi + 1) (ui – xi ) 
– 1 mod n 
      Si = ri
 – 1 bi
2 ti mod n 
Si is the signature of the authentication server on message mi. To verify the authenticity of the 
signature, he/she examines if the following equation holds good  
     Si = H (mi) (C i
2 + 1) mod n. 
Counting Phase: 
The Counting center verifies the signature of the ballot. Then the voter sends the key ki used 
in bit commitment .The counter open the ballot and and it puts (Si , Ci , CID) in the list. After 
the voting process is over the counter displays a list. The voter can verify his vote 
corresponding to the Si and Ci value of the voter. 
Finally when the S and C values match, the table that was created for the results is updated as 
per the candidates who have been voted . Finally after the completion of voting by all voters 
or end of the voting, the results are analysed. The rows are sorted by decreasing order of the 
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Fig 4.3 Snapshot showing Generation of unique ID 
 
 





Fig 4.5 Snapshot showing a voter that he has already voted  
 
 































In this thesis, we have implemented a secure internet voting protocol based on randomized 
enhanced Chaum’s blind signature schemes. The blinding factor in each step of the process 
maintains that breaking this protocol would not be easy. The project work envisages all the 
core components required for the functioning of the Internet voting Scheme and 
implementing it under Java makes it quite easy for extensions to various types of polling and 
voting schemes other than the 1-out-of-L scheme we have implemented. This scheme ensures 
the privacy of the voters and prevents any disruption by voters or the administrators. The 
implemented scheme covers most of the security requirements of the internet voting scheme 
including voting fairness. The problem of computer and the Internet security has taken a 
prominent and important place in today’s research area. Since electronic election is a part of 
these applications, it is of supreme importance as we will consider its emerging advantages in 
today’s modern life. This problem is open, researches in different universities and 
laboratories are still going on. Different protocols are emerging by the day, each with a hint 
of advancement over the other. With the growing use of internet in these days, it is evident 
that better and more secure protocols would come to the fore and their practicality can be 
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